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A Sea of Troubles? 
New Zealand’s Public Sector Neighbourhood
Roderic Alley*
Introduction
The 37th Pacifi c Islands Forum (PIF) witnessed some 
painful political infl ammation in 2006. Its October 
annual heads of government meeting, held in Fiji, 
saw Australian prime minister John Howard face a 
Melanesian wall of resentment. This was instigated 
by a row that erupted over former Solomon Islands 
attorney general Julian Moti, an Australian lawyer facing 
extradition over child sex charges, who was sheltered 
by Solomon Island prime minister Manasseh Sogavare 
and his Papua New Guinea counterpart, Sir Michael 
Somare. With Australian impatience and willingness to 
assert aid conditionality, the temperature rose sharply. 
Foreign Minister Alexander Downer claimed that 
taxpayers deserved a far better return for what had been 
invested in the region.1 (Currently, Australia provides 
more than A$300 million annual bilateral assistance to 
Papua New Guinea, and its outgoings to the Solomon 
Islands since 2003 are treble that amount.) A decision 
by the Howard government to stop a visit to Australia by 
Prime Minister Somare was widely viewed as a setback 
to neighbourly relations.
Political conditions in Fiji worsened as a showdown 
loomed between the commander of the Fiji military 
forces, Commodore Frank Bainimarama, and Prime 
Minister Laisenia Qarase’s government, each demanding 
the other’s resignation. Less spectacular, but as 
important, was growing public disaffection with the 
standards of governance evident in several Pacific 
Islands states. In response, local leadership groups have 
cried foul at having been blamed for historical and 
structural dependencies that they claim are beyond their 
responsibility or remedy.
Pressures mounted with a more overt, substantial 
Australian intervention into Melanesia, where, with 
New Zealand and other PIF administrations, the 
Howard government has played a dominant role since 
2003 in the 15-nation Regional Assistance Missions 
to the Solomons (RAMSI). This unprecedented 
involvement stemmed from Canberra’s belief that failing 
governance could expose the region to exploitation by 
activities associated with global terrorism.2 Designed 
not just to return civil order and secure weapons 
surrender, RAMSI sought to initiate broader peace 
reconstruction through the installation of a corruption-
free, accountable, retrained and service-oriented public 
sector.3 This was legitimised by the PIF’s non-binding, 
but consensus-backed, Biketawa Declaration of 2000 
committing members to ‘good governance, which is 
the exercise of authority (leadership) and interactions 
in a manner that is open, transparent, accountable, 
participatory, consultative and decisive, but fair and 
equitable’.4 The declaration adumbrated a scale of 
options designed to remedy internal crises, including, 
should it prove necessary, last-resort intervention based 
on PIF unanimity and host-state consent.
What do these conditions suggest for future public 
sector development within Pacifi c Island states? Will 
this see decay and slippage (as threatens with Papua New 
Guinea’s public health services losing ground in their 
battle against HIV/AIDS), or could the region’s current 
*  While accepting full responsibility for this paper, the author 
acknowledges the comments that Alastair Bisley provided on a 
draft.
1 Downer’s comments to Sky TV, cited by Greg Ansley, ‘Howard braces 
for Fiji storm’, New Zealand Herald, 21 October 2006, B6.
2 Australia has offered to assist Forum countries to allow the tracking 
of fi nancial fl ows, ‘including those funds used to support terrorism’. 
Item 14, Forum economic ministers’ meeting, Rotorua, 9–10 June 
2004, Forum Economic Action Plan 2004, at www.Forumsec.org.
fj/news/2004/June.
3 As of 2005, 88 local police offi cers had been charged with serious 
offences, including corruption, and a quarter of the force removed 
from offi ce (Wainwright, 2005, p.3).
4 Biketawa Declaration, agreed 28 October 2000, Kiribati, Pacifi c 
Islands Forum Secretariat, at  www.Forumsec.org.fj/news/2000.
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and perhaps future political or security crises give the jolt 
needed to catalyse effective public sector reform (one aim 
of the RAMSI exercise)? Regardless of either possibility, 
there is little doubting its necessity – whether for the 
future constitutional integrity, service-delivery needs, 
or problem-solving capacity of fragile political entities 
already heavily penalised by distance, remoteness, relative 
impoverishment and insularity. As a valued study has 
warned: ‘the cost of poor governance in a small society is 
very large, given the extreme diffi culty in recovering from 
the consequences of inappropriate polices and practices 
sustained over a long period. A national consensus on 
the importance of governance is needed in many small 
states, as is an appreciation of the ease with which the 
system can go off-track as a result of both domestic and 
external shocks’ (Commonwealth Secretariat and World 
Bank Task Force on Small States, 2000, p.39).
At one level, a grasp of the key issues at stake is simple: most 
Pacifi c Island citizens want improved nationwide basic 
services, an end to corruption, and educational facilities 
offering better employment and life chances. These calls 
have been variously conveyed through innumerable reports 
over the last two decades, this process itself adding a layer 
of complication. Now awash with recommendations, the 
region faces embarrassment that all this prescription has 
witnessed not just neglect or implementation failure, but 
actual deterioration in public sector standards. Lying at the 
core of this complication have been persisting claims and 
counter-claims over the cultural appropriateness of what 
is externally recommended – be it public agencies not 
beholden to traditional authority, programmes fostering 
gender neutrality, or rights-based entitlements. Elements of 
this division have permeated the PIF secretariat. Sometimes 
such concerns are genuine and justifi able; in other cases 
they provide cover for postponement or abuse of offi ce. 
At some stage, however (some beginnings are already 
detectable), the region will need to conduct its own diffi cult 
but salutary political battle over the nature and locus of 
domestic public responsibility. Central here is whether 
performance in offi ce will supplant kin or ethnic loyalty as 
the key driver in determining electoral outcomes.
In considering questions like this it is helpful to assess 
three avenues that have assumed salience in the relevant 
current policy discourse. They are: fi rst, attempts by 
the PIF’s Pacifi c Plan (Pacifi c Islands Forum Secretariat, 
2005) to advance one of its component objectives 
comprising principles of good governance; second, rights-
based formulations and the possibilities they offer for 
enhanced ownership, participation and implementation 
of devolved and central public sector functions; and third, 
a New Zealand dimension that embraces fi ndings from 
the recently published Law Commission report on human 
rights and culture in the Pacifi c, as well as associated 
development assistance considerations.
The Pacifi c Plan
The PIF Pacifi c Plan, endorsed by governments in 
2005, resulted from a designated task force, an oversight 
leadership group, the Forum secretariat, and feedback 
from relevant donor, offi cial and non-governmental 
interests. Good governance was included along with 
other key goals: economic growth (enhanced trade, 
infrastructure and private sector investment); sustainable 
development (poverty reduction, enhanced health, 
education, gender equality, cultural value protection); 
and security (maritime and aviation surveillance, 
border controls, law enforcement capacity, disaster 
management). Overall, the plan seeks to foster the 
bilateral and regional partnerships needed to support the 
institutional and resource commitments and political 
momentum needed to realise a range of specifi c goals. 
There is an assumption that the plan will remain the focus 
for future regional and national policy development. 
Necessarily, that will depend on the willingness of 
governments to assume fuller plan ownership, and to 
advance additional initiatives – including policy on 
migration and population growth.
So far as the Plan’s governance objectives are concerned, 
three aspects warrant note. First, the objectives of 
enhanced transparency, accountability, participation, 
equity and effi ciency are designed to secure sustainable 
resource management objectives as well as function 
as ends in themselves. While not overtly prescriptive, 
this is an attempt to legitimise the activities of national 
organisations striving to rein in the patrimonial, client-
based and rent-seeking political conduct of élites which 
abuse public offi ce for private gain.
Second, locally produced working papers provided 
as supplementary to the published Plan offer fruitful 
insights into what is termed a ‘governance defi cit’.5 They 
highlight gaps between what is practised and understood, 
5 See, for example, ‘Political governance’, Listing Gallery: Good 
Governance Pacifi c Plan, April 2005, at www.pacifl icplan.org.
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as distinct from what is required for public stewardship 
responsive to, and responsible for, the region’s citizens and 
resources. Identifi ed is an interlocking problem where, 
for the most part, a lack of national political purpose, 
direction and leadership has aggravated, but also emerged 
from, serious defi ciencies in fi nancial resources, human 
capacity, societal fabric, and the operative transmission 
and communication of public objectives. In essence, these 
local reports suggest that the societal and institutional 
software needed to secure the region’s democratisation is 
either missing or inadequate. 
These problems spiral inwards in other respects. The 
weakened problem-solving capacity of central public 
sector agencies renders them even more useful as 
employment and welfare bailiwicks, where nothing is 
risked at work that might jeopardise a salary feeding an 
extended family or wantok. Small, isolated and weak 
economies, vulnerable to the vicissitudes of weather 
or external economic conditions (e.g. Kiribati and 
Nauru), readily treat the public service as a system of 
welfare (Larmour and Barcham, 2006, p.175). Potential 
coordinating functions are weakened as parliamentarians 
engage in the direct delivery of services to their electoral 
clients, eroding political consideration of national 
needs.6 In turn, a vacuum in national policy analysis or 
formulation places even heavier reliance upon technical 
assistance from donor and lending agencies. Samoa’s 
relative success in coping with these problems has not 
been widely emulated (Delay, 2005). 
Third, fuller usage of good governance criteria is seen as 
assisting in recognising how local conditions compare 
internationally. Recently the World Bank has attempted 
to survey governance capacity through a cross-national 
comparison identifying six components: voice and 
accountability (measuring political, civil and human 
rights); political stability and absence of violence 
(assessing the likelihood of violent threat to, or changes 
in, government, including terrorism); governmental 
effectiveness (measuring the competence of the 
bureaucracy and public service delivery); regulatory 
quality (measuring what the Bank considers ‘market 
unfriendly’ policies); rule of law (quality of contract 
enforcement, judicial independence, incidence of 
crime); and control of corruption (assessing not just 
abuse of public power for private gain, but emboldened 
corruption comprising state capture by élites). Two 
comparisons are cited here, which are especially relevant 
given the PIF Secretariat’s decision to employ all six 
World Bank governance criteria for purposes of ongoing 
assessment throughout the region.7 
Country  Year Percentile  Standard Number of surveys/
  rank (0–100) Error polls 
Fiji 2005 47.8 0.23 3
Kiribati 2005 72.9 0.26 3
Marshall Is 2005 46.4 0.38 2
Nauru 2005 77.3 0.76 N/A
Palau 2005 52.2 0.76 N/A
P N Guinea 2005 18.8 0.16 8
Samoa 2005 84.1 0.26 3
Solomon Is 2005 19.3 0.26 3
Tonga 2005 63.3 0.26 3
Tuvalu 2005 87.9 0.33 1
Table 1: Rule of law: selected PIF countries
Source: D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, Governance 
Matter v Governance Indicators for 1996–2005, Washington DC: 
World Bank Group, 2005, at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/
governance/pubs/govmatters4.html.
Notes: For this and Table 2, percentile rank indicates the percentage 
of countries worldwide that rate below the country score identifi ed 
(subject to margin of error). Higher values thus indicate better 
governance ratings. For this and Table 2, the Cook Islands was 
6 Ibid.
7 For an application of these and related criteria to Fiji see Azmat 
Gani and Ron Duncan, ‘Fiji’s Governance Index’, paper presented 
to the Fiji Uptak., ANU/USP, 1 September 2004, at www.uspp.
ac.fj/fi leadmin/fi les/Institutes/piasdg/government.
listed in the survey, but without data being available for either of 
these dimensions. 
V
ol
um
e 
2,
 N
um
be
r 
4 
20
06
7
Country*  Year Percentile  Standard No surveys/
  rank (0–100) Error polls 
Fiji 2005 50.7 0.19 4
Kiribati 2005 72.0 0.20 3
Marshall Is 2005 89.4 0.21 2
Nauru 2005 80.2 0.21 2
Palau 2005 89.4 0.21 2
PN Guinea 2005 45.4 0.15 2
Samoa 2005 67.1 0.20 6
Solomon Is 2005 53.1 0.20 3
Tonga 2005 42.0 0.19 4
Tuvalu 2005 82.1 0.20 3
Such comparisons might convey more about 
unsatisfactory global conditions than they do about 
Pacifi c locations, suggesting the need (notwithstanding 
possible local resistance) for a benchmarking scale 
restricted to PIF members. At any rate, it is clear that 
public sector reform cannot progress in the absence 
of an effective rule of law, or legislative systems giving 
voice to constituents and holding political executives 
to account.
The Pacifi c Plan now faces the task of having to earn 
its persuasive credibility among élites most in need of 
what it recommends for cleaner public services – namely, 
enhanced audit, an ombudsman, judicial training, and 
codes of leadership accountability. These calls are not 
new. In 1997, PIF leaders endorsed eight principles 
of accountability, many being neglected, whether for 
reasons of malfeasance, technical skill shortage, or the 
continuing inadequacy of national statistical services.8 
To prosper, the Plan’s good governance agenda will 
probably require a willingness to develop hybrids, 
where, according to national circumstances, different 
mixes of non-state actor, local level, central and regional 
functions might blend. Fraenkel (2005, p.266) believes 
that the most important issue is not one of fi tting 
together indigenous and ‘western’ modes of governance, 
but rather how best to graft formerly village-based, 
highly personalised styles of leadership onto government 
Table 2: Voice and accountability: selected PIF countries
in newer and inevitably more impersonalised, post-
colonial state settings. 
Powell (2005, p.234) favours policies that encourage 
investment in a national environment, indirectly endowing 
state legitimacy through enhanced rural indigenous 
institutions with a capacity to enforce social norms and 
resolve collective action problems. For tidy minds that 
may seem a recipe for chaos, but exigency demands 
compromise. Certainly, lead functions would require clear 
identifi cation – possibly via a strong local personality of 
standing, publicly committed to making such a local mix 
work. With a pressing need to move beyond its current 
capital city ‘Honiara fi xation’, that prescription makes 
eminent sense for the Solomon Islands. 
The need to acknowledge the signifi cant legitimising 
functions performed by informal structures and 
beliefs, built on the known social space of personal 
8 The eight principles included: public and parliamentary disclosure 
of budgetary processes; full auditing of government, state-owned 
enterprise and statutory corporation accounts; similar disclosure of 
public loan agreements or guarantees; open competitive tendering 
of all government and public sector contracts; effective disciplining 
of financial regulation contravention; parliamentary committee 
empowerment for full fi nancial disclosure; adequate resource allocation 
for auditor-general and ombusdman activities; and safeguarding of 
central bank monitoring, advisory and independence functions. 
Implementation difficulties acknowledged by Forum economic 
ministers include either the lack of, or ambiguous or inadequate, 
legislation; defective enforcement capacity; and defi cient regulatory 
processes. Forum economic ministers June 2001, ‘Governance and 
Accountability: report on implementation of Forum’s eight principles 
of accountability’, at www.Forumsec.org.fj/docs/FEMM/2001.
Source: D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, op. cit.
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allegiances rather than formal structures of authority, 
seems imperative throughout much of Melanesia. The 
dominant public policy paradigms – often rational, 
centralist and hierarchical – discourage thinking that 
includes the admittedly messier, but potentially as 
fruitful, diversity of strategies. These include what 
Pope (1997, p.19) has termed a ‘transparency of 
relationships’.
This highlights a need for different Pacific Island 
locations to evolve home-grown philosophies of 
working subsidiarity. Paying lip service to principles 
of local delivery involvement, but often ignoring them 
in practice, donor behaviour could alter by having to 
operate through validated forms of devolution.
Other incentives encouraging hybridisation of 
governance functions – for example, fuller use 
of church and inter-faith processes – include the 
imperative need to confront a worsening spread of 
HIV/AIDS (Cullen, 2006), and whole-of-government 
approaches looking to comprehensive security as a 
principle in guiding post-confl ict reconstruction on 
Bougainville. For any of these initiatives, however, 
the risk of failure remains high in the absence of 
functioning political rights.
In sum, while the Pacifi c Plan has addressed key public 
sector requirements under a good governance rubric, 
its standing as a creation of the intergovernmental 
process, and one largely fi nanced by Australia and New 
Zealand, remains subject to the vicissitudes of national 
compliance. For Iosefa Maiava, delivering the 2006 
Siwatibau Memorial Lecture, support for the governance 
objectives of regional cooperation has been patchy and 
slow, possibly because it has been driven by outsiders 
‘with specifi c agendas and interests that are not always 
selfl ess’.9 However, economic assistance programmes 
encouraging local entrepreneurship are more likely to 
avoid the charge of neo-colonialism than those that 
are dominated by public or private organisations of 
donors (Rondinelli and Montgomery, 2005, p.21). 
Placing the PIF on a fi rmer statutory basis, a process 
currently in hand, could help foster procedures where, 
as in the OECD, prescriptive interchange between 
governments is diverse, routine, reciprocated and non-
confrontational.
Human rights
A rights-based approach to public sector reform in the 
Pacifi c is both more direct and less inhibited by the 
sovereignty sensitivities that were required to navigate 
the Pacifi c Plan. The capacity of rights issues to cause 
discomfort can prove positive by politicising demands 
for enhanced public sector capacities and deliveries of 
service. But what is needed to link advocacy pressures to 
observable institutional outcomes? Bridging functions 
include processes of community participation extending 
beyond voluntarism – indispensable though that 
remains – as well as legislative reform. 
The Regional Rights Resource Team offers an example 
of a Pacifi c-based organisation that offers technical and 
policy advice in Fiji, Kiribati, Solomon Islands, Tonga 
and Vanuatu. Its goals include the development of a 
human rights culture rather than project attempts to 
insert a rights-based approach into public sector conduct 
(Jalal, 2005). Though this project has limited resources, 
it has benefi ted through the heightened salience of 
human rights in donor agendas, extending in some 
instances to the withholding of funds in the event of 
serious rights violations by potential recipients. 
Corruption constitutes a major rights violation throughout 
the Pacifi c. Transparency International, with research 
funded by the Dutch government, has promoted attempts 
under its national integrity system to assess corruption 
and foster reform on a holistic basis. The key pillars of this 
system include: public awareness; public anti-corruption 
strategies; public participation; a fostering of ‘watchdog’ 
agencies, and appropriate roles for the news media; and 
judiciary, private sector and international cooperation.10 
Larmour and Barcham (2006), investigating the integrity 
system’s application to Pacifi c Island states, found pillars 
in place for most functions, but an absence of monitoring 
capacities, and no country with ‘an offi cial, dedicated, 
independent anti-corruption agency … though the 
Ombudsman Commission in Vanuatu (modelled on that 
in PNG) has the task of investigating and reporting on 
infractions of the mandatory “leadership code” affecting 
politicians and senior offi cials’ (Larmour and Barcham, 
2006, p.176).
9 Iosefa Maiava, ‘Governance and the Pacific Plan’, Savenaca 
Siwatibau Memorial Lecture, Suva, 3 May 2006, at www.tikiwiki.
org.
10 For a full listing see J. Pope, Transparency International 2000.
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Country Elections Seats Women % Women
New Zealand Sep 2005 121 39 32.2
Australia Oct 2004 150 37 24.7
Fiji May 2006  71  8 11.3
Samoa Mar 2006  49  2  4.1
Vanuatu Jul 2004  52  2  3.8
Tonga Mar 2005  30  1  3.3
Marshall Is Nov 2003  33  1  3.0
P N Guinea Jun 2002 109  1  0.9
F S Micronesia Mar 2005  14  0  0.0
Nauru Oct 2004  18  0  0.0
Palau Nov 2004  16  0  0.0
Solomon Is Apr 2006  50  0  0.0
Tuvalu Aug 2006  15  0  0.0
Table 3: Representation of women in Pacifi c Island Forum legislatures (lower or single house)
More broadly, the region’s observers link rights needs 
to associated institutional development requirements. 
Peebles sees the lack of a human rights intergovernmental 
system as an indication of the immaturity of the PIF as 
an effective regional structure (Peebles, 2005, p.195). He 
recommends the establishment of an Oceanic Human 
Rights Charter (Peebles, 2005, p.199-212). Powles (2005, 
p.262) identifi es a need to fi nd ‘ways of protecting and 
promoting tradition and culture, recognising that it is not 
static and is always evolving, while also acknowledging 
the universality of international human rights’. Hassall 
(2005, p.241) notes weak legislative capacity, including 
representative modes that ignore national need, abuse 
of position for private gain, incompetent law-making, 
ineffectual monitoring of the executive and, in totality, 
inadequate response to the needs of the people. 
A far higher level of representation of women in the 
region’s legislatures is essential (See Table 3).
At offi cial levels, reticence in the advancement of human 
rights has been evident, although a Pacifi c Island leaders 
meeting in Auckland in April 2004 pledged support to 
the PIF secretariat in enhancing the governance capacities 
of Forum members and related agencies by encouraging 
the creation of national human rights systems. However, 
tension persists between human rights advocacy and 
Pacifi c Island governments on grounds that criticism from 
within entails loss of face to foreigners, or on grounds of 
cultural relativism (Jalal, 2005, pp.5-7). The establishment 
of national human rights bodies, in accordance with the 
Paris Principles, has been slow, as has ratifi cation of relevant 
international instruments – for example, compliance with 
International Labour Organisation codes on collective 
bargaining and worker organisation.11
In attempting to work directly with Pacifi c Islands 
governments on rights issues, the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) has affi rmed that 
objectives of good governance for sustainable growth, 
equitable development, lasting peace and social cohesion 
will not occur without an integration of human rights 
into development policies and legislative frameworks. 
The UNDP has also claimed that ‘responsive and 
accountable institutions of governance are often the 
missing link between antipoverty efforts and poverty 
reduction’ (UNDP, 2000). That provides useful 
guidance, but a more critical test of the salience of 
human rights is the extent to which the issue assumes 
conditionality within future European Union and other 
development assistance profi les. 
Viewed in combination, human rights advancement, 
legislative reform (including public accounts committee 
functions), the representation of women, and civil 
society engagement will be severely tested in delivering 
11 The 1991 Paris Principles, endorsed by the United Nations, 
recommend, inter alia, the assumption by national human rights 
institutions of a broad competence to advise, recommend and report 
on national human rights conditions, monitor legislative enactments, 
investigate rights violations, encourage ratifi cation of international 
instruments, and promote rights education and anti-discrimination 
initiatives.
Source: New Zealand Law Commission, Converging Currents (2006), 7.26, pp. 90-1.
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the key policy outcomes identified in the 2000 
Millennium Development Goals. These encompass 
poverty eradication; universal primary education; 
gender equality and women’s empowerment; reduction 
of child mortality; improvement of maternal health; 
combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; and 
the development of global partnership in development. 
Regrettably, implementation of these objectives has 
been hampered by the failure of Pacifi c governments 
to engage legislatures and civil society interests prior to 
their endorsement (Morgan, 2005, p.12).
New Zealand’s engagement
As security conditions deteriorated in Fiji, more 
seriously on Bougainville, and then in the Solomon 
Islands, New Zealand’s focus on governance reform has 
sought to assist constitutional rehabilitation, judicial, 
police and rule of law functions, and some limited 
assistance to human rights advocacy through non-
governmental initiatives. Revealing a small increase, 
total New Zealand development assistance stood in 
2006 at 0.27% of gross national income, which included 
increased disbursements to Melanesia. 
In the last decade the most overt intervention 
by New Zealand for purposes of public sector 
refurbishment occurred in the Cook Islands. After 
the Cook Islands economy deteriorated sharply, 
in 1996 New Zealand instituted a wide-ranging 
programme through a series of ‘tough love’ austerity 
measures involving public sector downsizing, sale 
of state assets, a value-added tax, stimulation of 
private sector-led growth, and strengthening of 
fi nancial and economic management. Since then, 
the Cook Islands has received technical assistance 
for short-term training programmes. Other bilateral 
examples include law and justice sector enhancement 
(Fiji); community policing (Bougainville); service 
delivery and institutional strengthening (Samoa); and 
correction facility services (Vanuatu). 
Worthy and laudable, these initiatives nevertheless operate 
within a framework that is constrained by inadequate 
funding. Given those constraints, what more could be done? 
The Millennium Development Goals, already assuming a 
prominent role in New Zealand’s development assistance 
profi le, require stronger recipient national monitoring 
and ownership though civil society and governmental 
partnerships. New Zealand could further assist here, as it 
might with expertise in policy development and delivery 
of improved urban governance, property rights settlement, 
law reform and youth employment. 
The United Kingdom’s Department for International 
Development has established useful methodologies 
regarding the utilisation of non-state actors for the 
articulation of development assistance need and 
its delivery. New Zealand could encourage such 
an approach in PIF locations. Non-state providers 
could include individual practitioners, firms, 
citizen-based organisations, non-governmental 
organisations and faith-based bodies. Relevant 
research designs concentrate on policy dialogue by 
government with such providers; the regulation, 
oversight and monitoring functions that they can 
perform; facilitation, including access to fi nance and 
information; and the actual commissioning of service 
delivery (Batley, 2006, pp.193-6). 
The New Zealand Law Commission’s October 2006 
study Converging Currents: custom and human rights 
in the Pacifi c argues that the development of a Pacifi c 
jurisprudence will occur only as Pacifi c nations fi nd ways 
to better integrate custom and human rights as sources 
of law. Far from threatening custom, it is maintained, 
human rights can help it to develop and survive in a 
modern world. Such harmonisation, it is hoped, will 
work towards a cultural legitimating of human rights 
by advancing them in ways that reflect the values 
of Pacifi c societies. While the survey excludes issues 
relating to property rights, governance, corruption, self-
determination, intellectual property and non-customary 
restorative justice from in-depth consideration, it 
displays a willingness to test the extent to which existing 
custom coexists with human rights regarding the current 
role of women in the Pacifi c.12 Findings from this study 
warrant Pacifi c exposure and response.
12 Relevant citations from this study include: ‘It is clear that Pacifi c 
women have real cause to consider their treatment under custom 
law to be unjust’ (7.1); ‘A belief that political leadership is the 
preserve of men is deeply ingrained and regularly expressed’ (7.27); 
‘In some cases systematic bias is apparent in local government, 
particularly where this is in the hands of traditional leaders who are 
overwhelmingly male’ (7.31); ‘Violence against women is a major 
concern in the Pacifi c’ (7.35); ‘The evidence is compelling that 
custom law is substantially controlled by men and is often used 
to subordinate women’ (7.56); ‘Pacifi c women who speak out on 
human rights are generally comfortable with adapting it to refl ect 
human rights. Their main concern is to amend the male monopoly on 
custom’s interpretation and application’ (7.58); and ‘We believe that 
the issue of women’s rights may be the key to greater acceptance 
of human rights generally in the Pacifi c’ (7.62).
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Looking ahead
This paper has noted the ambivalence that persists 
throughout the Pacifi c Islands towards public sector 
reform. This reflects the continuing impact of a 
dichotomy bequeathed by decolonisation’s awkward 
grafting of indigenous authority systems onto the 
‘legitimation of administrative structures which had 
been established by colonial powers for colonial ends’ 
(Ghai, 1990, p.2). While colonialism may not have 
stinted on the scaffolding of public bureaucracy, this did 
not foster institutional accountability, or function in an 
environment dedicated to providing the education and 
information systems needed to build a national citizenry. 
While needing continued external technical expertise, 
enhanced public sector capacity in the Pacifi c will not 
emerge without the bracing provided by representative 
institutions organised and motivated to hold executives 
to account, nor without systems of law operating to 
professional standards of independence.
The setting’s diverse cultural and physical spaces 
can prove advantageous as an antidote to formulaic 
recommendations for public sector enhancement. 
Recognition and use of different local modalities 
could lessen current abuse of central political and 
administrative systems for private ends. Existing cultural 
and national rivalries need not obstruct the region’s 
learning from itself. Samoa’s relative success in handling 
development assistance through its stability, local high-
level championing, restriction on the number of donors, 
and integration with national planning warrants regional 
attention (Delay, 2005, pp.434-5). 
Advocates of public sector reform in the Pacifi c face 
diffi culties across a variety of fronts, as perceived external 
intervention consolidates primary loyalties among élites 
and power holders, who are disinclined to venture 
into the uncharted territory of greater recruitment of 
women into positions of public sector responsibility. 
Much of the existing public sector apparatus, concerned 
to maintain job security under conditions of high and 
continuing unemployment, remains averse to risk-
taking or utilising non-state interests for civil society 
engagement and service-delivery partnership purposes. 
That will have to change, however, in order to fulfi l 
agreed Millennium Development Goal targets.
Given the scant resources available to several small to very 
small Pacifi c Island entities, pooling and rationalisation 
of some functions – for example, in statistical services, 
border control technologies or telecommunications 
(as in the eastern Caribbean) – makes plausible sense. 
This will need stronger partnerships based on proven 
willingness to collaborate. Currently, however, there 
is no mistaking the caution evident throughout the 
region towards enhanced intergovernmental cooperation 
– whether from globalisation (a promise or a threat?), 
dominant Australian fi nancial and political capacity, or 
the role of even bigger players (the European Union, 
China). That attitudinal barrier is not insuperable, but 
reciprocity built on mutual respect will be required if 
it is to be overcome. 
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